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‘Euro-realism’ in the 2014 European Parliament elections: 




The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) emerged as the third largest ‘Euro-party’ 
after the 2014 European elections, and are now well-positioned to perform a central role 
alongside the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D) in the eighth session of the European Parliament (EP). Despite this, 
relatively little is known about the views that ECR politicians represent, especially their core 
party ideology of ‘Euro-realism’. In this article, it is argued that the development of ECR 
since 2009 is ultimately rooted in a central desire by its member party politicians to reform 
the European Union (EU) by addressing its ‘democratic deficit’ without destroying the wider 
integration project altogether. More widely, ECR is the most visible vehicle for ‘soft’ Euro-
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The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were the first to involve party candidates 
representing the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). ECR was established after 
the previous elections in 2009 by politicians from the United Kingdom (UK), Poland and the 
Czech Republic who were uncomfortable with the federalist policy of ‘ever closer union’ 
(European Union 2009) promoted by the main centre-right group, the European People's 
Party (EPP). Moreover, ECR performed relatively well in 2014, going on after talks to 
become the third largest ‘Euro-party’ behind EPP and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D) - and ahead of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) and the Greens / European Free Alliance (EFA). With 76 Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) in the Brussels and Strasbourg hemispheres, ECR is now a political party 
with which both EPP and S&D co-operate extensively in the 2014-19 parliamentary term. 
ALDE was the ‘kingmaker’ of the seventh European Parliament (EP7) as the third largest 
group (see VoteWatch 2011) and ECR can expect to hold the same influence in the eighth 
Parliament (EP8) given the number of MEPs which now represent it. 
 
Despite this, ECR is a relatively under-researched political movement, certainly compared to 
other longer established European party families or groupings. Its key political priorities will 
be outlined in this article, especially those connected to the relatively new concept of ‘Euro-
realism’. In general, ECR politicians try to highlight constructively problems related to the 
overall quality of government in the European Union (EU) (see Lijphart [1999]; Rothstein 
[2011]) and in particular the well-documented ‘democratic deficit’ (see Follesdal and Hix 
[2006]; Hobolt and Tilley [2014]; Marquand [1979]) without abandoning European 
integration altogether. More generally, ECR is the most prominent group representing ‘soft’ 
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Euro-scepticism in the EP (see Brack and Startin [2015]; Taggart and Szczerbiak [2008]; 
Usherwood and Startin [2013]).    
 
ECR is now made up of 26 parties from 18 different EU member states mostly from northern 
and central Europe while its larger umbrella group Alliance of European Conservatives and 
Reformists (AECR) also involves parties from countries outside the EU such as Armenia, 
Georgia and Turkey. Meanwhile, formal links have been established with partner parties 
further afield such as the Australian Liberals, the Canadian Conservatives and the 
Republicans in the United States (US). Many of these parties’ natural allies across Europe 
ought to be EPP and its wider party family, the Christian Democrats (CD) yet that grouping is 
undermined by the existence of ECR (see Hayward and Wurzel [2012]; Taylor [2007]). While 
CD politicians such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker broadly agree with ECR politicians such as British Prime 
Minister David Cameron and Polish President Andrej Duda about the benefits of the 
common market, they disagree fundamentally over the governance role of the EU in these 
policy areas.  
 
As Table 1 shows, the British Conservatives have the largest number of MEPs in ECR with 20 
out of 76 seats and have very much been the driving force of the party since Mr Cameron 
formally promised to leave EPP in 2005 during his leadership campaign in an attempt to win 
support from more Euro-sceptic-minded Members of Parliament (MPs) and MEPs (see 
Lynch and Whitaker [2008]). Law and Justice (PiS) - the governing party of Poland between 
2005 and 2007 and once more since October 2015 - has  18 while the Civic Democrats (ODS) 
from the Czech Republic, led in the past by former President Václav Klaus, now have only 
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two MEPs but  were central to articulating the concept of ‘Euro-realism’. In particular, Czech 
MEP Jan Zahradil is credited with having written on the subject from 2001 onwards when 
ODS enjoyed greater electoral success (see Hanley 2007).  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
Meanwhile, these established parties of government have also been joined by four MEPs 
from the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the biggest party in Belgium, who had previously 
been aligned to EFA on the basis of its civic nationalist policies for the Flanders region. Other 
ECR members include the Finns Party (PS), serving in a governing coalition in Helsinki since 
April 2015, and the Danish People’s Party (DF) - along with many individual MEPs from 
different countries in the EU. Perhaps the most significant addition to ECR since the start of 
the new parliamentary session came in the form of Alternative for Germany (AfD). By 
choosing to align its seven1 MEPs to ECR, the group overtook ALDE as the third largest 
parliamentary party for EP8. During EP7, ECR had only 55 MEPs so the results of the 2014 
elections and subsequent negotiations surrounding group membership can be considered 
progress (see McElroy and Benoit 2010).        
 
Figure 1 shows the number of MEPs each group has in EP8 (correct as of March 2016). The 
two largest European party families continue to hold the most seats - the Christian 
Democrat vehicle, EPP, has 215 seats while the European Socialists have 190. Nevertheless, 
it was EPP and S&D who had their vote squeezed most in 2014 while parties promoting 
Euro-sceptic positions increased their representation. The Europe for Freedom and Direct 
Democracy faction (EFDD) now has 45 seats, dominated by the UK Independence Party 
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(UKIP) and Italy’s Five Star Movement, while the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) 
group has 38 MEPs, including politicians from the National Front (FN) in France and Party for 
Freedom (PVV) in The Netherlands. In some EU member states, Euro-sceptic parties 
performed especially well, often winning the elections in terms of seats and vote share. In 
France, FN emerged as the largest party with 25% of the vote, the left-wing SYRIZA won in 
Greece with 27% of the vote while UKIP won 28% of the vote and 24 seats.  
 
Figure 1 around here 
 
Developing ‘Euro-realist’ policies 
ECR representatives have undertaken a significant amount of policy development since their 
group was first established by the British Conservatives in 2009 - much of which centres 
around the intriguing concept of ‘Euro-realism’. Yet what exactly do politicians from the 
now enlarged ECR mean in detail when they say they are ‘Euro-realist’? Is this an expedient 
term quickly thought up as a tactic or does it have more ideological substance? The 
preamble of the 2009 Prague Declaration refers to the ‘urgent need to reform the EU on the 
basis of Euro-realism, Openness, Accountability and Democracy, in a way that respects the 
sovereignty of our nations’ (ECR 2009). This offers some indication that ‘Euro-realism’ is 
primarily concerned with addressing the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ above all else – in 
particular, the need to protect the sovereignty of national parliaments to make law from the 
pressures of ‘ever closer union’. According to ECR (2014), ‘the Euro-realism concept 
distinguishes the ECR’s agenda from the other political groups. We believe in a new 
direction for the EU, which does not destroy the organisation or undermine cooperation’. 
When paying tribute to his predecessor as ECR leader, Martin Callanan, the new leader Syed 
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Kamall stated: ‘Martin has been a strong supporter of European reform and Euro-realism, 
and his hard work is a major part of the reason why the ECR is now growing and attracting 
new member parties’ (BBC News 2014c). 
 
After the 2014 elections, ECR augmented the Prague Declaration with the Reykjavik 
Declaration – and it is striking that seven out of the eight principles outlined now involve 
issues surrounding the quality of democracy in Europe. These include the importance of EU 
member states retaining their independence, the need for power to be exercised at the 
lowest level possible, the hope that individuals can be free from state interference, 
protecting the rule of law and ‘cherishing’ the role of civic associations in society (ECR, 
2015a). Only one – principle eight – refers to the need for the EU to prioritise trade, 
competition and commerce. A further investigation into ECR policy literature shows how the 
values of ‘reform’ and ‘democratic accountability’ constitute the main driving ideas behind 
‘Euro-realism’ (ECR 2015b). In one party article, ECR representatives also articulate the 
importance for ‘thinking governance before policy’ (ECR 2015c): ‘a governance structure, 
like the European Union, must be critiqued against principles apart from its ability to deliver 
policy’. It may also be noted that, according to VoteWatch (2014), ECR maintained a 
relatively strong ‘internal cohesion’ during European parliamentary term 2009-14, 
particularly when it came to policy areas such as constitutional matters.  
 
However, crucially, unlike the ENF and EFDD representatives, politicians from many ECR 
parties would regard themselves as ‘pro-European’. In the case of the New Flemish Alliance, 
for example, this is linked to what the party perceives as the advantages brought to the 
Flanders region by European investment -  on its website under ‘frequently asked 
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questions’, it states that N-VA is ‘without any doubt…a pro-Europe party’ (N-VA [2015]; see 
also Leruth [2014]). While AfD politicians do not support economic and monetary union and 
regard the Euro as a failed currency (Alternative for Germany 2014), they ‘bristle’ at being 
called ‘Euro-sceptic’ (BBC News 2014b). With regard to ODS, Hanley (2014) argues that its 
politicians display ‘scepticism without Euro-scepticism’ in the Czech Republic. Finally, even 
PiS’ opposition to what it regards as the EU’s equalities agenda and the implementation of 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights does not lead it as Poland’s governing party to 
support withdrawal from the EU altogether - rather, its politicians prefer to use rhetoric to 
argue that Europe should serve Poland, not vice versa, even arguing that adopting the Euro 
could theoretically benefit the national interest (see Szczerbiak [2014; 2012]).    
 
In this regard, ECR representatives therefore stand apart both from EPP politicians who 
regard European integration as being inseparable from the European common market and 
also from ‘hard’ Eurosceptic politicians who wish to see an end to the EU altogether - see 
Table  2 . This analysis confirms the inherent usefulness of the Sussex School’s ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ distinctions of party-based Euro-scepticism - an approach which emphasises that the 
policy platforms of ECR parties effectively constitute a form of ‘soft’ Euro-scepticism – as 
opposed to the ‘hard’ Euro-scepticism which is embodied by parties such as UKIP, as well as 
FN or PVV (see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008). Related definitions include identifying types of 
moderate ‘policy’ Euro-scepticism – for example, supporting European integration but 
opposing the Euro – as well as more populist manifestations of ‘national-interest’ Euro-
scepticism (see also Topaloff 2012). The successful emergence of ECR since 2009 is 
ultimately rooted in a desire by its representatives to reform the EU to improve its 
governance - ECR is now therefore the most visible organisation associated with ‘soft’ Euro-
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scepticism represented in the EP, promoting ‘governance before policy’ in the hope that it 
can democratise the internal workings of the EU (ECR 2015c).   
 
Table 2 around here 
 
For example, in the months preceding the referendum on 23 June 2016 asking voters 
whether or not Britain should leave or remain in the EU, Prime Minister David Cameron 
spent a considerable amount of time renegotiating key elements related to how the EU 
functions. In November 2015, he set out his four key objectives in a letter to the President 
of the European Council, Donald Tusk. Two of these four aims were explicitly related to 
‘quality of governance’ issues. First, Mr Cameron wanted an assurance that the UK could opt 
out of the core European principle of ‘ever closer union’, protecting in the process its 
sovereignty. Second, he also pressed for greater clarity in ‘economic governance’, ensuring 
that member states like the UK which were not members of the Eurozone would not be 
regarded as peripheral to any future financial decision-making that affects all EU–28. 
Indeed, even a third demand concerning ‘competiveness’ alluded to the wider structural 
framework and regulations of the single market (Cameron 2015). 
 
Identifying accurately the main elements of ‘Euro-realism’ is especially relevant given the 
way radical right parties like FN and PVV have now taken up the Euro-sceptic cause and 
started to be critical of the open borders created by the EU. Political scientists have long 
debated the type of recognisable criteria that apply to a ‘populist’ political party or a ‘far-
right’ one (see Mudde 2007). On the whole, the major ECR member parties can be clearly 
distinguished from many of the representatives in EFDD as well as the more radical ENF 
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MEPs – nevertheless, this remains a problematic aspect of the eighth EP for the British 
Conservatives as the only long-established Western European party of government in ECR 
(see Bale et al 2010). 
 
While both Central European parties, Poland’s Law and Justice and the Czech Civic 
Democrats, can be considered on the whole ‘mainstream’ right of centre organisations, 
their political activities are not entirely without controversy. PiS promotes a socially 
conservative position on issues related to human sexuality and family values (see Szczerbiak 
2014) as well as a traditionalist form of Polish nationalism while ODS became mired in a 
corruption scandal surrounding the financial activities of former Czech President Václav 
Klaus and the former Mayor of Prague, Pavel Bém – suffering electorally as a consequence 
(see Hanley 2014). In the Nordic countries, both the Finns Party and the Danish People’s 
Party can at the very least be regarded as ‘populist’ due to their often hostile stances 
towards immigration and multi-culturalism (see Meret [2010; Niemi [2013]). While AfD 
from Germany and the Belgian N-VA could not always be categorised as such, they have also 
at times been perceived to make negative contributions to these types of social cohesion 
issues – in particular, AfD has moved increasingly in that policy direction (see BBC News 
[2014a]; Lees [2015]; Table 3).  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
Yet collectively at least, ECR can be said to be the main standard holders for ‘soft’ Euro-
scepticism in the new EP, advocating a small state political economy model which 
encourages sovereign European countries to freely trade with one another (see Esping-
10 
 
Andersen 1990). This model can be contrasted with the corporatist European Social Model 
(ESM) associated with the Christian Democrats in countries such as Germany, The 
Netherlands, Austria and Belgium and more widely the EU itself - CD politicians promote a 
partnership between business, trade unions and government, and are relaxed about the 
overall size of the state. For example, a few months after the 2014 elections, British Prime 
Minister David Cameron met German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Dutch Prime Minister Mark 
Rutte2, and Fredrik Reinfeldt, the then Swedish Prime Minister, to discuss the future 
direction of the type of free market capitalist policies that they all broadly support. While 
they were in agreement over the need to promote greater levels of fiscal prudence across 
the 28 EU member states, they disagreed over whether ‘ever closer union’ was the problem 
or the solution to the ongoing financial crisis (BBC News 2014d). For ECR politicians, many of 
whom come from countries such as Britain and Poland where there is no Christian 
Democratic tradition3, the ESM has itself become a problematic part of the wider purpose of 
European governance since the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992. 
 
Identifying ‘Euro-realist’ voters 
The key aim of this article is to understand the still emerging political values of ECR more 
clearly - in order to do this, it is important to examine voting behaviour as well as policy 
positions. Moderate ‘Euro-realist’ concerns appear to be reflected in the political views of 
voters who support ECR parties – especially the British Conservatives. Conservative Party 
voters are generally on the ‘Euro-sceptic’ wing of the political spectrum and the policies of a 
party like UKIP are attractive to many of them. Yet equally, that is not quite the same as 
definitely wanting to leave the EU altogether. As a consequence of their parties’ increased 
representation, the level of detail in survey data surrounding the political attitudes of ‘Euro-
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sceptic’ voters has also improved - and this type of research is also helpful when trying to 
understand the policy development of ECR. Party politics across many European countries 
has become more multi-polar - including in the UK where ECR has its main voter base in the 
Conservative Party. The Conservatives also provide the wider ECR / AECR network with the 
bulk of its institutional leadership and support in Brussels, including its chair in the 
Parliament Syed Kamall MEP, chief executive Richard Milsom and secretary general Daniel 
Hannan MEP. An analysis of recent data taken from the 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey 
shows how it is possible to quantifiably distinguish Conservative supporters from voters of 
other parties on many political issues related to Europe - especially UKIP. 
 
In an attempt to advance democratic reforms in the EU, the UK Conservative Government  
legislated for an ‘in-out’ referendum in June 2016. This process also allowed the 
Conservatives to offer British voters an opportunity to democratically endorse EU 
membership for the first time since 1975. In response to the question: ‘How would you vote 
in a referendum to decide whether Britain does or does not remain a member of the EU?’, 
Table 4 shows that Conservative voters are essentially split over the issue of whether Britain 
ought to leave the EU altogether, with 34% wishing to remain, while 82% of UKIP voters are 
very much in favour of leaving. Meanwhile, both Labour and Liberal Democrat voters display 
greater enthusiasm for remaining in the EU than either Conservative or UKIP identifiers. 
   
 




In order to make a more controlled estimation for identifying British voters’ political 
attitudes towards Europe, the recent data taken from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
were analysed further. Multinomial logistic regression analysis was used as an appropriate 
model for comparing party support between Conservatives and UKIP in particular, 
controlling for socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes related to European 
integration.4 In order to make the analysis clearer, the focus is only on the four main UK 
political parties, with the Conservative Party compared to the other three: Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats and UKIP. Table 5 includes the results of analysing the differences in 
respondents’ voting preferences based on their attitudes towards issues related to Europe 
as well as controlling for other socio–economic characteristics.  
 
Table 5 around here 
 
The results show that characteristics such as age, gender and education, and attitudes such 
as appreciating the benefits of EU membership, are all significant variables for distinguishing 
between the party identification of respondents. As respondents get older, they prefer to 
vote Conservative rather than Labour or Liberal Democrat. With regard to gender, it can be 
noted fewer women voters appear to identify with UKIP than with the Conservatives. 
Meanwhile, respondents with post-school qualifications tend to vote Conservative rather 
than Labour compared to respondents with no-post school qualifications, and the same 
applies if Conservatives are compared with Liberal Democrats. In terms of attitudes towards 
the EU, those respondents who recognise the benefits of the UK being in the EU are more 
likely to vote Labour than Conservative, with the same type of relationship apparent 
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between the variables for predicting a vote for the Liberal Democrats over the 
Conservatives.  
 
Importantly, when party identification for the Conservatives is compared with party 
identification for UKIP, those who see the benefits of EU membership for Britain are much 
more likely to vote Conservative than UKIP. The more the subject is optimistic about the 
role of the UK in the EU, the more he or she will be prone to support the Conservatives over 
UKIP.5 While Labour and Liberal Democrat voters can be considered more enthusiastic 
about the EU than Conservatives, Conservative voters are still much more positive than UKIP 
supporters – on this basis, Conservative voters can be placed in the middle of the spectrum 
of British voter attitudes towards Europe. With regard to acknowledging the benefits of 
immigration from other EU member states, Labour identifiers appear to be more positive 
than Conservative voters, although in turn, Conservatives are happier to recognise the wider 
benefits of free trade than Labour supporters. ‘Euro-realist’ British Conservative voters, 
then, seem to echo the wider sentiments of ECR party leaders, as well as many Europeans, 
according to Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2007; 2011) - broad support for 
the European integration process but not without any criticisms or reservations.  
 
The growth and formal development enjoyed by ECR parties from 2009 to 2014 can be in 
part connected to the wider political fallout from the Eurozone crisis and the subsequent 
structural reforms initiated by member state governments on the recommendation of the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Support for European integration remains relatively healthy across EU-28 but structural 
problems associated with the democratic deficit in Brussels have also begun to be 
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highlighted more and more. ECR politicians are able to pursue an ‘inter-governmental’ 
(Hoffman 1966) alternative to the ‘integrationist’ agenda so prevalent amongst EPP 
politicians whilst also simultaneously remaining distinct from more populist and ‘hard’ 
forms of Euro-scepticism increasingly prevalent in public opinion.     
 
Conclusion 
In 2006, at the Conservative Party conference, and before he became UK Prime Minister, 
David Cameron stated: ‘We need to stop banging on about Europe’ (BBC News 2006). Mr 
Cameron’s aim was to suggest that adopting an extreme approach to European integration 
was not constructive, and certainly not the way for his party to win back power. The 
comment also simultaneously reveals a divide between the British Conservatives and 
enthusiasts for ‘ever closer union’ such as the German Christian Democrats who regard 
European affairs as central to all aspects of public policy. Equally, for ‘hard’ Euro-sceptics 
such as UKIP, European integration is not a matter for realistic reform – it is an entirely 
wrong policy to be abandoned as soon as is possible. In leaving EPP, Mr Cameron has been 
able to make a symbolically ‘Euro-sceptic’ gesture while simultaneously remaining distinct 
from the more radical politics of UKIP and its parliamentary group, EFDD (see Bale 2006). 
 
Ultimately, ‘Euro-realism’ articulates a wider desire reflected in European public opinion - 
for reforming the EU without destroying completely the wider European integration 
process. Europe’s dominant conservative strain may be Christian Democracy, directly mixing 
economic policies with social policies, but ‘Euro-realist’ ECR politicians would argue that the 
roots of Europe’s present crisis are ultimately a consequence of placing those types of 
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policies before addressing problems connected with the wider quality of EU governance and 
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Table 1: ECR member state parties, European Parliamentary Term 2014-2019 
 
Political party Member state MEPs 
 
Conservatives United Kingdom 20 
Law and Justice Poland 18 
 Alliance for Progress and Renewal Germany 5  
New Flemish Alliance Belgium 4 
Danish People’s Party Denmark 4 
*Alternative for Germany Germany 2 
Civic Democrats Czech Republic 2 
Finns Party Finland 2 
Conservatives and Reformists  Italy 2 
Bulgaria Without Censorship Bulgaria 1 
Bulgarian National Movement Bulgaria 1 
Croatian Party of Rights Croatia 1 
Independent Cyprus 1 
Family Party Germany 1 
Notis Marias Greece 1 
Brian Crowley Ireland 1 
National Alliance Latvia 1 
Electoral Action of Poles Lithuania 1 
Christian Union Netherlands 1 
Reformed Political Party Netherlands 1 
M10 Romania 1 
Right Wing of the Republic Poland 1 
Freedom and Solidarity Slovakia 1 
New Majority Slovakia 1 
Ordinary People Slovakia 1 
Ulster Unionists United Kingdom 1 
 























In favour Low priority In favour In favour 
ECR 
 
Against High priority In favour Mixed 
EFDD  
 





















Table 3: ECR member parties and key group policy aims 
 
Free countries  Free markets Free people 
 
 
Conservatives Conservatives  Conservatives  
 
ALFA ALFA ALFA 
 




























Table 4: How would you vote in a referendum on EU membership (%)? 
 
 Remain in the EU 
 
Leave the EU Cannot choose 
Conservative 
 
34 43 22 
Labour 
 
49 28 22 
Liberal Democrat 
 
59 24 18 
UKIP 
 
10 82 8 
 


















Table 5: Predicting British political party identification  
 
 (Parameter estimates and standard errors) 
  Lab vs. Con  Lib Dem vs. Con  UKIP vs. Con 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
   
Age -0.28 (0.06)*** -0.19 (0.11)* -0.42 (0.11) 
Gender  -0.03 (0.19) 0.28 (0.34) -0.87 (0.34)*** 
Marital status 0.36 (0.20)* 0.46 (0.34) -0.25 (0.36) 
Education  0.71 (0.22)*** 0.59 (0.39)* 0.16 (0.36) 
Occupation  
 
0.34 (0.24) -0.43 (0.46) 0.60 (0.43) 
Political attitudes    
Feeling European  0.34 (0.30) -0.97 (0.40)** -0.16 (0.55) 
Benefits of EU 
membership 
0.41 (0.11)*** 0.26 (0.18)* -0.91 (0.21)*** 
Benefits of EU 
immigration 
0.17 (0.08)** 0.14 (0.14) 0.85 (0.14) 
Benefits of free trade 
 
-0.29 (0.13)** 0.49 (0.24)** -0.25 (0.23) 
Constant -0.58 -0.37 3.53 
Nagelkerke R-Sq 0.24   
(N) (817)   
 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at p<.1, p<.05, p<.01 respectively. Multinomial 
logistic regression presenting equations on predicting differences between respondents’ 
party identification. The dependent variable on party identification includes five categories, 
with those of particular interest presented in the table above; independent variables are all 
coded 1 or 0, or on a continuous scale.     
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1. In July 2015, AfD split, with former leader Bernd Lucke establishing a new party, 
Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA). However, the five MEPs who left, including Mr 
Lucke, all remain in ECR. 
 
2. It may be noted that Mr Rutte is the leader of the People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD) in The Netherlands which is aligned to ALDE, not EPP. Nevertheless, the 
acrimonious nature of the UK Conservatives leaving EPP is substantively different from VVD 
politicians choosing not to be in the same group as the Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA).     
 
3. For more on the ideological distinction between ‘conservative’ and ‘Christian Democrat’, 
see Dalton et al (2011) and Mair (1990). 
 
4. The explanatory variable has more than two categories to be analysed; explanatory 
variables are both categorical and on a continuous scale.  
 
5. If a subject were to increase his or her score on the benefits of the EU by one point, the 
multinomial log odds of him or her preferring UKIP to Conservatives would be expected to 
decrease by 0.91 units while holding all other variables in the model constant. 
 
 
